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Spis treści

Security and Usability. Designing Secure Systems that People Can Use eBook -- spis treści

• Security and Usability
• Preface
  • Goals of This Book
  • Audience for This Book
  • Structure of This Book
  • Conventions Used in This Book
  • Safari Enabled
  • How to Contact Us
  • Acknowledgments
• I. Realigning Usability and Security
  • One. Psychological Acceptability Revisited
    • 1.1. Passwords
    • 1.2. Patching
    • 1.3. Configuration
    • 1.4. Conclusion
    • 1.5. About the Author
  • Two. Why Do We Need It? How Do We Get It?
    • 2.1. Introduction
    • 2.2. Product: Human Factors, Policies, and Security Mechanisms
      • 2.2.1. Impossible Demands
      • 2.2.2. Awkward Behaviors
      • 2.2.3. Beyond the User Interface
    • 2.3. Process: Applying Human Factors Knowledge and User-Centered Approaches to Security Design
      • 2.3.1. Security Is a Supporting Task
      • 2.3.2. A Process for Designing Usable Secure Systems
    • 2.4. Panorama: Understanding the Importance of the Environment
      • 2.4.1. The Role of Education, Training, Motivation, and Persuasion
      • 2.4.2. Building a Security Culture
    • 2.5. Conclusion
    • 2.6. About the Authors
  • Three. Design for Usability
    • 3.1. Death by Security
    • 3.2. Balance Security and Usability
      • 3.2.1. Exploit Differences Between Users and Bad Guys
      • 3.2.2. Exploit Differences in Physical Location
      • 3.2.3. Vary Security with the Task
      • 3.2.4. Increase Your Partnership with Users
        • 3.2.4.1. Trust the user
        • 3.2.4.2. Exploit the special skills of users
        • 3.2.4.3. Remove or reduce the users burden
      • 3.2.5. Achieve Balanced Authentication Design
        • 3.2.5.1. Remove unnecessary password restrictions
        • 3.2.5.2. The Doctor and password madness
      • 3.2.6. Balance Resource Allocation
    • 3.3. Balance Privacy and Security
    • 3.4. Build a Secure Internet
      • 3.4.1. Ringworld
        • 3.4.1.1. Within the Castle Keep
        • 3.4.1.2. Within the Ramparts
        • 3.4.1.3. The Town Wall
        • 3.4.1.4. Beyond the Town Wall
      • 3.4.2. Ringworld Interface
    • 3.5. Conclusion
    • 3.6. About the Author
  • Four. Usability Design and Evaluation for Privacy and Security Solutions
    • 4.1. Usability in the Software and Hardware Life Cycle
      • 4.1.1. Unique Aspects of HCI and Usability in the Privacy and Security Domain
      • 4.1.2. Usability in Requirements
      • 4.1.3. Usability in Design and Development
      • 4.1.4. Usability in Postrelease
    • 4.2. Case Study: Usability Involvement in a Security Application
      • 4.2.1. The Field Study
      • 4.2.2. The User Tests
        • 4.2.2.1. Test 1
        • 4.2.2.2. Test 2
        • 4.2.2.3. Test 3
      • 4.2.3. The Return on Investment (ROI) Analysis
    • 4.3. Case Study: Usability Involvement in the Development of a Privacy Policy Management Tool
      • 4.3.1. Step One: Identifying Privacy Needs
      • 4.3.2. Step Two: Performing In-Depth Interview Research
      • 4.3.3. Step Three: Designing and Evaluating a Privacy Policy Prototype
      • 4.3.4. Step Four: Evaluating Policy Authoring
    • 4.4. Conclusion
    • 4.5. About the Authors
  • Five. Designing Systems That People Will Trust
    • 5.1. Introduction
      • 5.1.1. Definitions of Trust
      • 5.1.2. The Nature of Trust in the Digital Sphere
    • 5.2. The Trust-Risk Relationship
      • 5.2.1. Technology Factors
      • 5.2.2. Trust and Credibility
    • 5.3. The Time-Course of Trust
    • 5.4. Models of Trust
      • 5.4.1. Early Work on Modeling Trust
      • 5.4.2. Bhattacherjees Model of Trust
      • 5.4.3. Lee, Kim, and Moons Model of Trust
      • 5.4.4. Corritores Model of Trust
      • 5.4.5. Eggers Model of Trust
      • 5.4.6. McKnights Model of Trust
      • 5.4.7. Riegelsbergers Model of Trust
      • 5.4.8. Looking at the Models
    • 5.5. Trust Designs
    • 5.6. Future Research Directions
    • 5.7. About the Authors
• II. Authentication Mechanisms
  • Six. Evaluating Authentication Mechanisms
    • 6.1. Authentication
      • 6.1.1. Accessibility Barriers
      • 6.1.2. Human Factors
      • 6.1.3. Security
      • 6.1.4. Context and Environment
    • 6.2. Authentication Mechanisms
      • 6.2.1. What the User IsBiometrics
      • 6.2.2. What the User KnowsMemometrics
        • 6.2.2.1. Random passwords (uncued recall)
        • 6.2.2.2. Cultural passwords (cued recall)
      • 6.2.3. What the User RecognizesCognometrics
        • 6.2.3.1. Recognition-based systems
        • 6.2.3.2. Position-based systems
      • 6.2.4. What the User Holds
      • 6.2.5. Two-Factor Authentication
    • 6.3. Quality Criteria
      • 6.3.1. Accessibility
      • 6.3.2. Memorability
      • 6.3.3. Security
      • 6.3.4. Cost
    • 6.4. Environmental Considerations
      • 6.4.1.
        • 6.4.1.1. Accessibility
        • 6.4.1.2. Memorability
        • 6.4.1.3. Security
        • 6.4.1.4. Cost
    • 6.5. Choosing a Mechanism
      • 6.5.1. An Online Banking Example
        • 6.4.1.5. The critical criterion: accessibility
        • 6.4.1.6. The vital criterion: security
        • 6.4.1.7. The significant criteria: memorability and cost
        • 6.4.1.8. The incidental criterion: nothing
    • 6.6. Conclusion
    • 6.7. About the Author
  • Seven. The Memorability and Security of Passwords
    • 7.1. Introduction
    • 7.2. Existing Advice on Password Selection
    • 7.3. Experimental Study
    • 7.4. Method
    • 7.5. Results
    • 7.6. Discussion
    • 7.7. Acknowledgments
    • 7.8. About the Authors
  • Eight. Designing Authentication Systems with Challenge Questions
    • 8.1. Challenge Questions as a Form of Authentication
      • 8.1.1. Using Challenge Questions for Credential Recovery
      • 8.1.2. Using Challenge Questions for Routine Authentication
    • 8.2. Criteria for Building and Evaluating a Challenge Question System
      • 8.2.1. Privacy Criteria
      • 8.2.2. Security Criteria
      • 8.2.3. Usability Criteria
    • 8.3. Types of Questions and Answers
      • 8.3.1. Question Types
      • 8.3.2. Answer Types
    • 8.4. Designing a Challenge Question Authentication System
      • 8.4.1. Determining the Number of Questions to Use
      • 8.4.2. Determining the Types of Questions and Answers to Use
        • 8.4.2.1. Determining the appropriate question type
        • 8.4.2.2. Determining the appropriate answer type
      • 8.4.3. Complementary Security Techniques
    • 8.5. Some Examples of Current Practice
      • 8.5.1. About the Author
  • Nine. Graphical Passwords
    • 9.1. Introduction
    • 9.2. A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Words
      • 9.2.1. Image Recognition
      • 9.2.2. Tapping or Drawing
      • 9.2.3. Image Interpretation
    • 9.3. Picture Perfect?
      • 9.3.1. Security
        • 9.3.1.1. Key generation
        • 9.3.1.2. Authentication
      • 9.3.2. Usability
      • 9.3.3. Discussion
    • 9.4. Lets Face It
    • 9.5. About the Authors
  • Ten. Usable Biometrics
    • 10.1. Introduction
      • 10.1.1. Biometrics Types
      • 10.1.2. Issues of Biometrics Specificity
      • 10.1.3. The Fingerprint Example
    • 10.2. Where Are Biometrics Used?
      • 10.2.1. Physical Access Control
      • 10.2.2. Immigration and Border Control
      • 10.2.3. Law and Order
      • 10.2.4. Transaction Security
    • 10.3. Biometrics and Public Technology: The ATM Example
      • 10.3.1. ATM Fingerprint Verification
      • 10.3.2. ATM Face Verification
      • 10.3.3. ATM Iris Verification
      • 10.3.4. ATM Retina Verification
      • 10.3.5. ATM Hand Verification
      • 10.3.6. ATM Speaker Verification
      • 10.3.7. ATM Signature Verification
      • 10.3.8. ATM Typing Verification
    • 10.4. Evaluating Biometrics
      • 10.4.1. Performance Metrics
    • 10.5. Incorporating User Factors into Testing
      • 10.5.1. Size of User Base
      • 10.5.2. Designing a Biometrics Solution to Maximize the User Experience
      • 10.5.3. Enrollment
      • 10.5.4. Biometrics Capture
      • 10.5.5. Outliers and Fallback Strategies
        • 10.5.5.1. Exception handling of outliers
        • 10.5.5.2. Exception handling of temporary exclusions
        • 10.5.5.3. Exception handling of aging
      • 10.5.6. User Acceptance
        • 10.5.6.1. Promoting user acceptance
        • 10.5.6.2. Privacy
    • 10.6. Conclusion
    • 10.7. About the Author
  • Eleven. Identifying Users from Their Typing Patterns
    • 11.1. Typing Pattern Biometrics
    • 11.2. Applications
      • 11.2.1. Authentication
      • 11.2.2. Identification and Monitoring
      • 11.2.3. Password Hardening
      • 11.2.4. Beyond Keyboards
    • 11.3. Overview of Previous Research
    • 11.4. Evaluating Previous Research
      • 11.4.1. Classifier Accuracy
      • 11.4.2. Usability
      • 11.4.3. Confidence in Reported Results
    • 11.5. Privacy and Security Issues
    • 11.6. Conclusion
    • 11.7. About the Authors
  • Twelve. The Usability of Security Devices
    • 12.1. Introduction
    • 12.2. Overview of Security Devices
      • 12.2.1. OTP Tokens
      • 12.2.2. Smart Cards
      • 12.2.3. USB Tokens
      • 12.2.4. Biometrics Devices
    • 12.3. Usability Testing of Security Devices
      • 12.3.1. Setting Up the Test
      • 12.3.2. Related Work
      • 12.3.3. Usability Testing Methodology
    • 12.4. A Usability Study of Cryptographic Smart Cards
      • 12.4.1. Aim and Scope
      • 12.4.2. Context and Roles Definition
      • 12.4.3. User Selection
      • 12.4.4. Task Definition
      • 12.4.5. Measurement Apparatus
      • 12.4.6. Processing for Statistical Significance
      • 12.4.7. Computation of the Quality Attributes Scores
      • 12.4.8. Results and Interpretation
      • 12.4.9. Some Initial Conclusions
    • 12.5. Recommendations and Open Research Questions
    • 12.6. Conclusion
    • 12.7. Acknowledgments
    • 12.8. About the Authors
• III. Secure Systems
  • Thirteen. Guidelines and Strategies for Secure Interaction Design
    • 13.1. Introduction
      • 13.1.1. Mental Models
      • 13.1.2. Sources of Conflict
      • 13.1.3. Iterative Design
      • 13.1.4. Permission and Authority
    • 13.2. Design Guidelines
      • 13.2.1. Authorization
        • 13.2.1.1. 1. Match the most comfortable way to do tasks with the least granting of authority.
        • 13.2.1.2. 2. Grant authority to others in accordance with user actions indicating consent.
        • 13.2.1.3. 3. Offer the user ways to reduce others authority to access the users resources.
        • 13.2.1.4. 4. Maintain accurate awareness of others authority as relevant to user decisions.
        • 13.2.1.5. 5. Maintain accurate awareness of the users own authority to access resources.
      • 13.2.2. Communication
        • 13.2.2.1. 6. Protect the users channels to agents that manipulate authority on the users behalf.
        • 13.2.2.2. 7. Enable the user to express safe security policies in terms that fit the users task.
        • 13.2.2.3. 8. Draw distinctions among objects and actions along boundaries relevant to the task.
        • 13.2.2.4. 9. Present objects and actions using distinguishable, truthful appearances.
        • 13.2.2.5. 10. Indicate clearly the consequences of decisions that the user is expected to make.
    • 13.3. Design Strategies
      • 13.3.1. Security by Admonition and Security by Designation
        • 13.3.1.1. Security by admonition
        • 13.3.1.2. Security by designation
        • 13.3.1.3. Advantages of designation
        • 13.3.1.4. Implementing security by designation
        • 13.3.1.5. Implementing security by admonition
      • 13.3.2. User-Assigned Identifiers
      • 13.3.3. Applying the Strategies to Everyday Security Problems
        • 13.3.3.1. Email viruses
        • 13.3.3.2. Other viruses and spyware
        • 13.3.3.3. Securing file access
        • 13.3.3.4. Securing email access
        • 13.3.3.5. Cookie management
        • 13.3.3.6. Phishing attacks
        • 13.3.3.7. Real implementations
    • 13.4. Conclusion
    • 13.5. Acknowledgments
    • 13.6. About the Author
  • Fourteen. Fighting Phishing at the User Interface
    • 14.1. Introduction
      • 14.1.1. Anatomy of a Phishing Attack
      • 14.1.2. Phishing as a Semantic Attack
    • 14.2. Attack Techniques
    • 14.3. Defenses
      • 14.3.1. Message Retrieval
        • 14.3.1.1. Identity of the sender
        • 14.3.1.2. Textual content of the message
      • 14.3.2. Presentation
      • 14.3.3. Action
      • 14.3.4. System Operation
      • 14.3.5. Case Study: SpoofGuard
    • 14.4. Looking Ahead
    • 14.5. About the Authors
  • Fifteen. Sanitization and Usability
    • 15.1. Introduction
    • 15.2. The Remembrance of Data Passed Study
      • 15.2.1. Other Anecdotal Information
      • 15.2.2. Study Methodology
      • 15.2.3. FORMAT Doesnt Format
      • 15.2.4. DELETE Doesnt Delete
      • 15.2.5. A Taxonomy of Sanitized Recovered Data
    • 15.3. Related Work: Sanitization Standards, Software, and Practices
      • 15.3.1. DoD 5220.22-M
      • 15.3.2. Add-On Software
      • 15.3.3. Operating System Modifications
    • 15.4. Moving Forward: A Plan for Clean Computing
    • 15.5. Acknowledgments
    • 15.6. About the Author
  • Sixteen. Making the Impossible Easy: Usable PKI
    • 16.1. Public Key Infrastructures
    • 16.2. Problems with Public Key Infrastructures
    • 16.3. Making PKI Usable
      • 16.3.1. Case Study: Network-in-a-Box
      • 16.3.2. Case Study: Casca
      • 16.3.3. Case Study: Usable Access Control for the World Wide Web
      • 16.3.4. Instant PKIs
      • 16.3.5. What Makes a PKI Instant?
    • 16.4. About the Authors
  • Seventeen. Simple Desktop Security with Chameleon
    • 17.1. Introduction
      • 17.1.1. File Organization in Chameleon
      • 17.1.2. Interrole Communication and Network Access
      • 17.1.3. Advanced Role Features
    • 17.2. Chameleon User Interface
    • 17.3. Chameleon Interface Development
      • 17.3.1. Study 1: Paper Prototype (Security in Context)
      • 17.3.2. Study 2: Paper Prototype (Security Mechanisms)
      • 17.3.3. Study 3: Visual Basic Prototype
    • 17.4. Chameleon Implementation
      • 17.4.1. Window System Partitioning
      • 17.4.2. Filesystem Security
      • 17.4.3. Network Security and Interprocess Communication
      • 17.4.4. Software Architecture for Usability and Security
    • 17.5. Conclusion
    • 17.6. Acknowledgments
    • 17.7. About the Authors
  • Eighteen. Security Administration Tools and Practices
    • 18.1. Introduction
    • 18.2. Attacks, Detection, and Prevention
    • 18.3. Security Administrators
      • 18.3.1. Profile of a Security ManagerJoe
      • 18.3.2. Profile of a Security EngineerAaron
    • 18.4. Security Administration: Cases from the Field
      • 18.4.1. Security Checkup
        • 18.4.1.1. Case 1: MyDoom
        • 18.4.1.2. Case 2: Intrusion alertfalse alarm
        • 18.4.1.3. Case 3: Real-time network monitoring
        • 18.4.1.4. Case 4: Security scan
      • 18.4.2. Attack Analysis
        • 18.4.2.1. Case 5: Persistent hackers
      • 18.4.3. The Need for Security Administration Tools
    • 18.5. Conclusion
    • 18.6. Acknowledgments
    • 18.7. About the Authors
• IV. Privacy and Anonymity Systems
  • Ninteen. Privacy Issues and Human-Computer Interaction
    • 19.1. Introduction
    • 19.2. Privacy and HCI
    • 19.3. Relevant HCI Research Streams
      • 19.3.1. Usability Engineering
      • 19.3.2. Computer-Supported Cooperative Work
      • 19.3.3. Individual Differences
      • 19.3.4. Ubiquitous Computing (Ubicomp)
    • 19.4. Conclusion
    • 19.5. About the Authors
  • Twenty. A User-Centric Privacy Space Framework
    • 20.1. Introduction
      • 20.1.1. Privacy
      • 20.1.2. Exoinformation
    • 20.2. Security and Privacy Frameworks
      • 20.2.1. Codes of Fair Information Practice
      • 20.2.2. The ISTPA Privacy Framework
      • 20.2.3. Schneiers Security Processes Framework
      • 20.2.4. The Privacy Space Framework
    • 20.3. Researching the Privacy Space
      • 20.3.1. Feature Analysis
        • 20.3.1.1. Example 1: PGP Freeware
        • 20.3.1.2. Example 2: WebWasher
        • 20.3.1.3. Example 3: ZoneAlarm
        • 20.3.1.4. Phase one results
      • 20.3.2. Validation
    • 20.4. Privacy as a Process
    • 20.5. Conclusion
    • 20.6. About the Author
  • Twenty One. Five Pitfalls in the Design for Privacy
    • 21.1. Introduction
      • 21.1.1. Understanding
      • 21.1.2. Action
    • 21.2. Faces: (Mis)Managing Ubicomp Privacy
      • 21.2.1. Faces Design
      • 21.2.2. Formative Evaluation
    • 21.3. Five Pitfalls to Heed When Designing for Privacy
      • 21.3.1. Concerning Understanding
        • 21.3.1.1. Pitfall 1: Obscuring potential information flow
        • 21.3.1.2. Evidence: Falling into the pitfall
        • 21.3.1.3. Evidence: Avoiding the pitfall
        • 21.3.1.4. Pitfall 2: Obscuring actual information flow
        • 21.3.1.5. Evidence: Falling into the pitfall
        • 21.3.1.6. Evidence: Avoiding the pitfall
      • 21.3.2. Concerning Action
        • 21.3.2.1. Pitfall 3: Emphasizing configuration over action
        • 21.3.2.2. Evidence: Falling into the pitfall
        • 21.3.2.3. Evidence: Avoiding the pitfall
        • 21.3.2.4. Pitfall 4: Lacking coarse-grained control
        • 21.3.2.5. Evidence: Falling into the pitfall
        • 21.3.2.6. Evidence: Avoiding the pitfall
        • 21.3.2.7. Pitfall 5: Inhibiting established practice
        • 21.3.2.8. Evidence: Falling into the pitfall
        • 21.3.2.9. Evidence: Avoiding the pitfall
    • 21.4. Discussion
      • 21.4.1. Mental Models of Information Flow
      • 21.4.2. Opportunities for Understanding and Action
      • 21.4.3. Negative Case Study: Faces
      • 21.4.4. Positive Case Study: Instant Messaging and Mobile Telephony
    • 21.5. Conclusion
    • 21.6. Acknowledgments
    • 21.7. About the Authors
  • Twenty Two. Privacy Policies and Privacy Preferences
    • 22.1. Introduction
    • 22.2. The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P)
      • 22.2.1. How P3P Works
      • 22.2.2. P3P User Agents
    • 22.3. Privacy Bird Design
      • 22.3.1. Capturing User Privacy Preferences
      • 22.3.2. Communicating with Users About Web Site Privacy Policies
      • 22.3.3. Privacy Icons
    • 22.4. Privacy Bird Evaluation
      • 22.4.1. User Survey
      • 22.4.2. Laboratory Study
    • 22.5. Beyond the Browser
    • 22.6. About the Author
  • Twenty Three. Privacy Analysis for the Casual User with Bugnosis
    • 23.1. Introduction
    • 23.2. The Audience for Bugnosis
    • 23.3. Cookies, Web Bugs, and User Tracking
      • 23.3.1. Tracing Alice Through the Web
        • 23.3.1.1. Visiting multiple sites
        • 23.3.1.2. Unique identification with referrers and third-party cookies
      • 23.3.2. Using Web Bugs to Enable Clickstream Tracking
        • 23.3.2.1. The web bug: a definition
        • 23.3.2.2. What about second-party transactions?
      • 23.3.3. Bugnosis: Theory of Operation
        • 23.3.3.1. One-sided errors
        • 23.3.3.2. Detecting but not blocking web bugs
      • 23.3.4. Presenting the Analysis
      • 23.3.5. Alerting the User
    • 23.4. The Graphic Identity
    • 23.5. Making It Simple Is Complicated
      • 23.5.1. Using Browser Helper Objects and the Document Object Model
      • 23.5.2. The Event Model
        • 23.5.2.1. Provisional analysis
        • 23.5.2.2. Rescanning, refreshing, and Old Paint
      • 23.5.3. The Analysis Pane and Toolbar
        • 23.5.3.1. The discovery dance
        • 23.5.3.2. Making the Analysis Pane feel natural
        • 23.5.3.3. Analyzing pop-up windows
      • 23.5.4. Installation and Uninstallation
        • 23.5.4.1. Installation/uninstallation problems
        • 23.5.4.2. Windows XP Service Pack 2
    • 23.6. Looking Ahead
      • 23.6.1. Exposing Email Tracking
      • 23.6.2. Platform for Privacy Preferences Project
      • 23.6.3. Further Privacy Awareness Tools and Research
    • 23.7. Acknowledgments
    • 23.8. About the Author
  • Twenty Four. Informed Consent by Design
    • 24.1. Introduction
    • 24.2. A Model of Informed Consent for Information Systems
      • 24.2.1. Disclosure
      • 24.2.2. Comprehension
      • 24.2.3. Voluntariness
      • 24.2.4. Competence
      • 24.2.5. Agreement
      • 24.2.6. Minimal Distraction
    • 24.3. Possibilities and Limitations for Informed Consent: Redesigning Cookie Handling in a Web Browser
      • 24.3.1. What Are Cookies and How Are They Used?
      • 24.3.2. Web Browser as Gatekeeper to Informed Consent
      • 24.3.3. Web Browser Development and Progress for Informed Consent: 1995-1999
      • 24.3.4. Redesigning the Browser
      • 24.3.5. Technical Limitations to Redesigning for Informed Consent
      • 24.3.6. Reflections
    • 24.4. Informing Through Interaction Design: What Users Understand About Secure Connections Through Their Web Browsing
      • 24.4.1. Participants
      • 24.4.2. Users Conceptions of Secure Connections
        • 24.4.2.1. Definition of a secure connection
        • 24.4.2.2. Recognition of a connection as secure or not secure
        • 24.4.2.3. Visual portrayal of a secure connection
      • 24.4.3. Reflections
    • 24.5. The Scope of Informed Consent: Questions Motivated by Gmail
      • 24.5.1. What Is Gmail?
      • 24.5.2. How Gmail Advertisements Work
      • 24.5.3. Gmail and the Six Components of Informed Consent
        • 24.5.3.1. Disclosure
        • 24.5.3.2. Comprehension
        • 24.5.3.3. Voluntariness
        • 24.5.3.4. Competence
        • 24.5.3.5. Agreement
        • 24.5.3.6. Minimal distraction
      • 24.5.4. Two Questions Related to Informed Consent
        • 24.5.4.1. The question of machines reading personal content
        • 24.5.4.2. The question of indirect stakeholders
      • 24.5.5. Reflections
      • 24.5.6. Design Principles for Informed Consent for Information Systems
    • 24.6. Acknowledgments
    • 24.7. About the Authors
  • Twenty Five. Social Approaches to End-User Privacy Management
    • 25.1. A Concrete Privacy Problem
    • 25.2. Acumen: A Solution Using Social Processes
      • 25.2.1. Acumen Overview
      • 25.2.2. The Acumen User Interface
    • 25.3. Supporting Privacy Management Activities with Social Processes
      • 25.3.1. Awareness and Motivation
        • 25.3.1.1. Awareness and motivation in Acumen
      • 25.3.2. Learning and Education
        • 25.3.2.1. Learning and education in Acumen
      • 25.3.3. Decision Making
        • 25.3.3.1. Decision making and herd behavior
    • 25.4. Deployment, Adoption, and Evaluation
      • 25.4.1. Deployment and Adoption
        • 25.4.1.1. Deployment and adoption in Acumen
      • 25.4.2. User Needs Evaluation
        • 25.4.2.1. User needs evaluation in Acumen
      • 25.4.3. Technological Evaluation
        • 25.4.3.1. Technological evaluation in Acumen
    • 25.5. Gaming and Anti-gaming
      • 25.5.1. Anti-gaming Techniques in Acumen
    • 25.6. Generalizing Our Approach
      • 25.6.1. Four Key Questions for a Privacy Management System
      • 25.6.2. Sketching a System Design
    • 25.7. Conclusion
    • 25.8. About the Authors
  • Twenty Six. Anonymity Loves Company: Usability and the Network Effect
    • 26.1. Usability for Others Impacts Your Security
    • 26.2. Usability Is Even More Important for Privacy
      • 26.2.1. Case Study: Usability Means Users, Users Mean Security
      • 26.2.2. Case Study: Against Options
      • 26.2.3. Case Study: Mixminion and MIME
      • 26.2.4. Case Study: Tor Installation, Marketing, and GUI
      • 26.2.5. Case Study: JAP and its Anonym-o-meter
    • 26.3. Bootstrapping, Confidence, and Reputability
    • 26.4. Technical Challenges to Guessing the Number of Users in a Network
    • 26.5. Conclusion
    • 26.6. About the Authors
• V. Commercializing Usability: The Vendor Perspective
  • Twenty Seven. ZoneAlarm: Creating Usable Security Products for Consumers
    • 27.1. About ZoneAlarm
    • 27.2. Design Principles
      • 27.2.1. Know Your Audience
      • 27.2.2. Think Like Your Audience
      • 27.2.3. Eliminate Clutter
      • 27.2.4. Eliminate Complexity
      • 27.2.5. Create Just Enough Feedback
      • 27.2.6. Be a Customer Advocate When Usability and Competitive Pressure Collide
    • 27.3. Efficient Production for a Fast Market
    • 27.4. Conclusion
    • 27.5. About the Author
  • Twenty Eight. Firefox and the Worry-Free Web
    • 28.1. Usability and Security: Bridging the Gap
    • 28.2. The Five Golden Rules
      • 28.2.1. Identifying The User
      • 28.2.2. 1. Enforce the Officer/Citizen Model
      • 28.2.3. 2. Dont Overwhelm the User
      • 28.2.4. 3. Earn Your Users Trust
      • 28.2.5. 4. Put Out Fires Quickly and Responsibly
      • 28.2.6. 5. Teach Your Users Simple Tricks
    • 28.3. Conclusion
    • 28.4. About the Author
  • Twenty Nine. Users and Trust: A Microsoft Case Study
    • 29.1. Users and Trust
      • 29.1.1. Users Reactions to Trust Questions
      • 29.1.2. Users Behavior in Trust Situations
      • 29.1.3. Security Versus Convenience
      • 29.1.4. Making Decisions Versus Supporting Decisions
    • 29.2. Consent Dialogs
      • 29.2.1. Consent Dialog Redesign
    • 29.3. Windows XP Service Pack 2A Case Study
      • 29.3.1. ActiveX Dialogs
      • 29.3.2. File Download Dialogs
    • 29.4. Pop-Up Blocking
    • 29.5. The Ideal
    • 29.6. Conclusion
    • 29.7. About the Author
  • Thirty. IBM Lotus Notes/Domino: Embedding Security in Collaborative Applications
    • 30.1. Usable Secure Collaboration
    • 30.2. Embedding and Simplifying Public Key Security
      • 30.2.1. Signing and Decrypting Email
      • 30.2.2. Encrypting Email
    • 30.3. Designing Security Displays
      • 30.3.1. User Security Panel
        • 30.3.1.1. Displaying public key certificates
        • 30.3.1.2. Limitations and results
      • 30.3.2. Database Access Control Information
        • 30.3.2.1. Adding power and complexity
    • 30.4. User Control of Active Content Security
      • 30.4.1. Deployment Study
      • 30.4.2. Solutions and Challenges
    • 30.5. Conclusion
    • 30.6. About the Author
  • Thirty One. Achieving Usable Security in Groove Virtual Office
    • 31.1. About Groove Virtual Office
    • 31.2. Groove Virtual Office Design
      • 31.2.1. The Weakest Link
      • 31.2.2. Do the Right Thing
      • 31.2.3. Is That You, Alice?
      • 31.2.4. Colorful Security
    • 31.3. Administrators Strengths and Weaknesses
    • 31.4. Security and Usability
    • 31.5. About the Authors
• VI. The Classics
  • Thirty Two. Users Are Not the Enemy
    • 32.1. The Study
    • 32.2. Users Lack Security Knowledge
    • 32.3. Security Needs User-Centered Design
    • 32.4. Motivating Users
    • 32.5. Users and Password Behavior
    • 32.6. About the Authors
  • Thirty Three. Usability and Privacy: A Study of KaZaA P2P File Sharing
    • 33.1. Introduction
      • 33.1.1. Abuses on KaZaA Today
      • 33.1.2. Unintended File Sharing Among KaZaA Users
      • 33.1.3. Users Downloading Others Private Files
    • 33.2. Usability Guidelines
    • 33.3. Results of the Cognitive Walkthrough
      • 33.3.1. Changing the Download File Directory
      • 33.3.2. Sharing Files
      • 33.3.3. Adding Files to the My Media Folder
      • 33.3.4. Uploading Files
      • 33.3.5. Summary of Usability Guidelines
    • 33.4. A Two-Part User Study
      • 33.4.1. Parts of the Study
        • 33.4.1.1. KaZaA sharing comprehension questions
        • 33.4.1.2. Current sharing settings discovery task
      • 33.4.2. Results
        • 33.4.2.1. KaZaA sharing comprehension questions
        • 33.4.2.2. Current sharing settings discovery task
      • 33.4.3. Suggested Design Improvements
    • 33.5. Conclusion
    • 33.6. Acknowledgments
    • 33.7. About the Authors
  • Thirty Four. Why Johnny Cant Encrypt
    • 34.1. Introduction
    • 34.2. Understanding the Problem
      • 34.2.1. Defining Usability for Security
      • 34.2.2. Problematic Properties of Security
      • 34.2.3. A Usability Standard for PGP
    • 34.3. Evaluation Methods
    • 34.4. Cognitive Walkthrough
      • 34.4.1. Visual Metaphors
      • 34.4.2. Different Key Types
      • 34.4.3. Key Server
      • 34.4.4. Key Management Policy
      • 34.4.5. Irreversible Actions
      • 34.4.6. Consistency
      • 34.4.7. Too Much Information
    • 34.5. User Test
      • 34.5.1. Purpose
      • 34.5.2. Description
        • 34.5.2.1. Test design
        • 34.5.2.2. Participants
      • 34.5.3. Results
        • 34.5.3.1. Avoiding dangerous errors
        • 34.5.3.2. Figuring out how to encrypt with any key
        • 34.5.3.3. Figuring out the correct key to encrypt with
        • 34.5.3.4. Decrypting an email message
        • 34.5.3.5. Publishing the public key
        • 34.5.3.6. Getting other peoples public keys
        • 34.5.3.7. Handling the mixed key types problem
        • 34.5.3.8. Signing an email message
        • 34.5.3.9. Verifying a signature on an email message
        • 34.5.3.10. Creating a backup revocation certificate
        • 34.5.3.11. Deciding whether to trust keys from the key server
    • 34.6. Conclusion
      • 34.6.1. Failure of Standard Interface Design
      • 34.6.2. Usability Evaluation for Security
      • 34.6.3. Toward Better Design Strategies
    • 34.7. Related Work
    • 34.8. Acknowledgments
    • 34.9. About the Authors
• Index
• About the Authors
• Colophon
• Copyright